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One of the key aspects of the evolution of knowledge is certainly the dynamics of concepts, that is how 
concepts are developed, disseminated, and appropriated over a long span of time. In this paper, I tackle 
this broad issue by adopting a comparative and deployment-oriented approach to concepts. By 
discussing the case of the stability proof of the solar system, I argue that the very idea of stability as a 
scientific problem emerged as a consequence of the transformation of the concept of natural order in 
astronomy from a metaphysical and theological notion into an effective tool for mathematical research. 
According to a deeply ingrained narrative, supported by astronomy textbooks, popular accounts, and 
some scholarly works, Newton’s gravitation theory entailed very naturally the question whether the 
solar system would continue in its orderly periodic movements or would at some stage collapse. The 
narrative goes on that this fundamental question was eventually answered by Pierre Simon Laplace in 
the mid-1770 (or, alternatively, mid-1780) with the proof, now known to be partial, that the solar 
system is made up of strictly periodic motions. The aim of this paper is to present a totally different 
perspective. First, I argue that, in the original Newtonian framework, the stability of the solar system 
was not a subject of physical and mathematical inquiry. The cosmological question of stability only 
turned up within a larger theological and metaphysical discourse, which did not affect physical practice. 
Rather, Newton and his followers were much more concerned with the study of specific planetary 
inequalities, most notably the motion of the Lunar apogee and the great anomaly of Jupiter and Saturn. 
 
After Euler’s breakthrough in the late 1740s and the ensuing development of modern perturbation 
theory, these anomalies were attacked by new and more powerful analytical methods. The main 
protagonist of the vigorous grow of perturbation theory was Joseph Louis Lagrange. Throughout the 
1770s, Lagrange refined, extended, and generalized the techniques used in physical astronomy to a level 
never seen before. Thus, my second claim is that, by introducing new formidable mathematical practices 
(changes of variables, integrals of motion, perturbation function), Lagrange realized that perturbation 
theory could aspire to more than just solving localized problems. 
 
Eventually, it was in the early 1780s that Lagrange, for the first time, clearly posed the problem of 
stability of the solar system and provided a general solution. Laplace, who, admittedly, had also 
contributed to the development of perturbation theory in an important way, further improved 
Lagrange’s methods and solved the long-standing mysteries of the Lunar motion and the 
anomalous motion of Jupiter and Saturn. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, Laplace’s 
extremely influential Mécanique Céleste and the whole Laplacian school consolidated the narrative 
today still widely accepted. 
 
This intricate episode, which, from Newton’s Principia to Laplace’s solution of the secular acceleration of 
the Moon, covers almost exactly one hundred years, will allow me to raise two important points. First, I 
will argue that, although mathematicians in the eighteenth century talk less about natural order than 
their predecessors in the seventeenth century, the concept of order does not disappear. Rather it is 
turned from a metaphysical notion into a tool of research. The necessity of solving by approximation 
Euler’s equations of planetary motion led to the introduction of mathematical techniques (such as the 
method of variation of constants), which relied on the assumption that the heavenly motions were a 
complex composition of periodic trajectories. Only when perturbation theory reached a sufficient 
maturity, it became possible to reflect on the status of this assumption and to raise the question of 
stability. This deep connection between concept dynamics and mathematical practices suggests that 
one should look more carefully at how concepts are concretely deployed to produce knowledge rather 
than how they represent it. 
 
Second, the development of perturbation theory provided, so to speak, the structural conditions for the 
solution of the problem of stability, but it did not, ultimately, determined the legitimacy of the question. 
To understand the dynamics of the concept of order, one needs to look at the modification of the 
general cultural and philosophical climate in mid-eighteenth century. There are two key factor, I argue, 
that facilitated a reflexive approach to order. The first factor was the development of epistemology as 
an autonomous field of philosophical research no longer related to the theological discourse. A de-
theologized epistemology encouraged the search for the foundations of scientific knowledge within the 
knowledge process itself. The second factor was the appearance of the notion of self-organization. 
During the eighteenth century, scholars started to look at processes of self-organization in fields as 
diverse as life science, political economy, and social theory. The regular behavior of systems seemingly 
very complex such as the financial market suggested not only the idea that some laws were at work in 
there, but also that these systems had some sort of inherent order that can be made subject of scientific 
investigation. In order to enlarge the investigation to other discourses it is thus necessary to assume a 
comparative approach: one needs to include in the analysis the way in which concepts are deployed in 
the argumentative practices of neighbor fields of research and the dynamics that 
allows them to migrate from one field to another. 
 
